Making a 'lake' of South China Sea

PAN-TONKIN GULF ECONOMIC COOPERATION SCHEME
Making a 'lake' of South China Sea
By Li Mingjiang, For The Straits Times
15 Jan 2008

DESPITE the reduced tension in the South China Sea over the past few years, diplomatic tussles over sovereignty and resource claims have never been absent. This is evidenced by the recent war of words between Hanoi and Beijing when China staged a military exercise near the disputed Paracels and decided to set up Sansha county in Hainan to manage jurisdictional matters in the South China Sea.
This notwithstanding, the general climate remains one in which the six claimants - China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei - prefer cooperation to conflict. This is largely due to their willingness to put aside their disputes over some areas in favour of common economic development and regional strategic interests. Various confidence-building measures, in particular the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, have contributed to the relative tranquillity in this maritime region.

A new proposal initiated by China may provide further incentive for the various parties to move beyond the status quo. This proposal calls for a regional economic cooperation framework known as the Pan-Tonkin Gulf Regional Economic Cooperation scheme, which is strongly pushed by the local government of China's Guangxi Autonomous Region.

The proposed scheme, if eventually adopted by China and Asean, has the potential to further de-securitise the South China Sea and could lead to breakthroughs in multilateral cooperation in such areas as maritime transportation, environmental protection, and joint exploitation of resources.

The origin of the proposal is the China-Asean Free Trade Agreement (FTA) framework in which Guangxi, together with Vietnam, proposed a Tonkin Gulf regional economic cooperation zone. Apart from Vietnam, this scheme would include China's Guangxi, Guangdong and Hainan provinces. Starting from early 2006, Guangxi began to push for a wider Pan-Tonkin Gulf economic cooperation scheme to include parts of China's south-west and south-east, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei.

The expansion of the original sub-regional economic zone is an effort on the part of Guangxi to construct its coastal area as a new economic growth centre in China. It is also partly an effort to compete with Yunnan province in strengthening economic cooperation with South-east Asia.

Guangxi proposed that the Pan-Tonkin Gulf scheme be part of what is called a physically M-shaped structure in China-Asean cooperation: the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS); the Nanning to Singapore corridor (Mainland economic cooperation); and the Pan-Tonkin Gulf zone (Maritime economic cooperation). Guangxi does not have advantages in the GMS, but the Pan-Tonkin Gulf zone and the M-shaped strategy will allow it to play a leading role in China-Asean economic cooperation.

Former Guangxi Party leader Liu Qibao proposed that the Pan-Tonkin Gulf cooperation scheme be officially incorporated into the Asean-China FTA framework. The scheme has won the support of top Chinese leaders. During an inspection visit to Guangxi in August last year, President Hu Jintao encouraged Guangxi to further open up and take full advantage of its littoral position to push for multilateral economic cooperation beyond the Tonkin Gulf.

Premier Wen Jiabao also made encouraging comments on the proposal both at the memorial summit of the China-Asean summit in November 2006 and at the 10th China-Asean summit in January last year. Guangxi's local government recently submitted the official policy proposal to the central government in Beijing. Various ministries are currently reviewing and revising the proposal. With the top leadership favouring the initiative, the Pan-Tonkin Gulf cooperation scheme is likely to be launched and pushed by China in the China-Asean bilateral framework.

There are a few reasons why leaders in Beijing think favourably of this initiative. It is perceived as useful in rapidly developing the economy in Guangxi, still a relatively poor province, and the economic development in China's vast under-developed mid-western regions. Also, it is believed to contribute positively to the China-Asean FTA because those South-east Asian countries involved in the cooperation are relatively developed.

The proposal has won in-principle approval from other regional states, including Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, apart from

Vietnam. Guangxi has already begun to set up an expert team together with the Asean Secretariat and the Asian Development Bank to push for the scheme.

The Pan-Tonkin Gulf cooperation plan, if fully implemented, would be very significant for security in the South China Sea. This is because the envisioned cooperation would turn the sea into some sort of 'internal lake' of the regional economic zone.

A high degree of security in the South China Sea is, in turn, a necessary condition for the regional cooperation scheme to function smoothly. More importantly, in the proposed plan, there are a few

areas that directly deal with the South China Sea. For instance, there is a recommendation for a network of ports surrounding the South China Sea. There is also a proposal for cooperation in fisheries, maritime energy, maritime environment and tourism around the sea.

Substantive cooperation in any of these functional areas would mean a major breakthrough in the South China Sea dispute. Chinese analysts and top leaders have commented that the emergence of the Pan-Tonkin Gulf zone will help initiate China-Asean dialogue and cooperation in maritime affairs. It will also serve as a platform for communication and coordination among various parties on the South China Sea.

The Pan-Tonkin Gulf regional cooperation, now strongly pushed by China, is likely to give further impetus for Beijing to engage other claimant states on the South China Sea dispute. If the relevant Asean countries eventually agree to join hands in the new sub-regional cooperation scheme, the time will soon come when all parties in the South China Sea dispute earnestly tackle this maritime issue. They will find it helpful to revisit many of those policy recommendations that were proposed at the Indonesia-initiated workshops in the 1990s and various joint development schemes or schemes of sharing resources that had been suggested by the scholarly community.

This new economic integration project, if ultimately realised, will give the region some reason to be optimistic about the stability of the South China Sea in the near future.


Li Mingjiang is an Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

Jan 14, 2008
China + India = Chindia, a strategic partnership
By C. Raja Mohan, For The Straits Times
IN THEIR talks this week in Beijing, the visiting Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao hope to unveil a new phase in bilateral relations.
After the unreal idealism of the 1950s, war and conflict during the 1960s and 1970s, and a wary normalisation of ties during the 1980s and 1990s, India and China are seeking to inject real strategic content into their relationship.

Both countries are today acutely aware of their own changing positions in the global power hierarchy. Self-assurance in both the capitals has begun translating into a new engagement that promises to transcend the traditional emphasis on contentious bilateral issues.

Although much of the world has been animated by the rise of China and the emergence of India, and their potential impact on the world - from global warming to the Asian balance of power - Beijing and New Delhi were burdened for long by a narrow bilateral framework.

To be sure, the idea of 'Chindia' - of China and India taking on the world - was invented a few years ago in New Delhi. On its part, China in recent years has repeatedly reaffirmed its desire for a genuine friendship with India.

Despite their aspirations for a strategic partnership, mutual suspicion over Tibet, an intractable boundary dispute, and differences over Pakistan were among the many issues that limited the scope of the relationship in the past.

It is only now, amidst a grudging acceptance of each other's rise, that China and India have begun to explore a broader agenda of regional and international cooperation.

Until recently, China used to view India as a mere regional power within the subcontinent. Worse still, the Chinese establishment was convinced that India, with its internal chaos, would never get its act together.

Over the last decade, India has surprised China in many ways. India not only defied the international system by conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, but it has also successfully negotiated its entry into the nuclear club by cultivating a special relationship with the Bush administration. India's unprecedented high growth rates in recent years have also made it clear to Beijing that the economic momentum behind New Delhi's rise is now real and consequential.

New Delhi's successful big power diplomacy - including a rapprochement with Washington and Tokyo - has made Beijing aware of India's potential to constrict China's room for manoeuvre. As India pulls away from its dispirited sibling Pakistan, China's traditional policy of balancing India within the subcontinent has become unsustainable.

India, too, has steadily come to terms with the implications of China's rise. The Indian industry, which initially feared economic competition from Beijing, now sees China as a huge economic opportunity. Trade between the two nations has increased about a hundredfold - from a measly US$300 million (S$430 million) a decade ago to nearly US$38 billion in 2007. The Indian Prime Minister and the Chinese President are now expected to set more ambitious targets for bilateral trade.

India, which in the past was anxious about China's ties with its smaller neighbours, is now reconciled to the inevitability of Beijing's rising profile in and around the subcontinent. For the Indian strategic establishment, the answer lies not in a perennial gripe but in emulating China's forward-looking economic policies towards the neighbours.

Amidst its growing economic and military capabilities, India is now more confident of raising its own profile in the presumed backyard of China - East and South-east Asia.

Given the burden of the past, Dr Singh and Mr Hu are bound to pay some attention to the old bilateral agenda. In their joint declaration, the two sides are likely to review the progress made so far on the boundary dispute and reaffirm their political commitment to its early resolution.

Thanks to a reasonably stable frontier and the new breadth of the bilateral ties, the two leaders are expected to focus on the construction of a partnership that looks at a wider regional and global agenda.

One element of the putative strategic partnership lies in mutual political reassurance that they do not pose a security threat to each other. On the eve of his three-day visit to Beijing, Dr Singh had once again reaffirmed that India will not join any alliance aimed at containing China. Beijing, in turn, has recognised the dangers of pushing India into the arms of the United States and the importance of encouraging New Delhi to take a more relaxed view of China's rise.

Second, India and China are likely to emphasise their shared interest in regional stability in different sub-regions of Asia. The effect that a failed state in Pakistan would have on their own security is likely to nudge Dr Singh and Mr Hu to exchange views on the deepening structural crisis in India's very important western neighbour. While it is premature to talk of Sino-Indian cooperation in stabilising Pakistan, New Delhi's vastly improved relations with Islamabad have begun to alter the old triangular dynamic between India, China and Pakistan.

Beyond the subcontinent, India and China will have to work hard to harmonise their positions in the Central, South-east and East Asian regions. All indications are that there is a new political will in both the capitals to begin a serious conversation about their common neighbourhood.

Third, as their national interests turn global, India and China are beginning to bump into each other in different regions of the world.

Dr Singh and Mr Hu now recognise the importance of minimising the potential for future conflict, and maximising the prospect for greater cooperation on a range of issues - from global trade talks to international terrorism, and from African development to energy security.

As the two leaders work on a significant regional and global agenda, sceptics around the world will be looking for any movement on an issue that has cast a sha-

dow over the future of Sino-Indian relations - China's ambiguity regarding India's nuclear deal with the United States.

An explicit signal from the Chinese leadership during Dr Singh's visit that Beijing will not oppose the implementation of the Indo-US civil nuclear initiative, and might even be prepared to embark on atomic energy cooperation with India, could fundamentally alter the popular Indian misgivings about China and pave the way for a real strategic partnership between the two Asian giants.

C. Raja Mohan is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

WORKING TOGETHER
b>Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao now recognise the importance of minimising the potential for future conflict, and maximising the prospect for greater cooperation on a range of issues - from global trade talks to international terrorism, and from African development to energy security.

Only Way Out In Sri Lanka Jan 14

Jan 14, 2008 ST
Only way out in Sri Lanka
THE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam score little more than public relations points with their declaration that they would maintain a discredited ceasefire which the Sri Lankan government has said it will formally abandon this week. The outlook is grim. Both sides have missed opportunities to resolve Asia's longest-running civ-
il war. The closest they came to ending the cycle of violence was in 2002 when then prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe sought to trade autonomy for peace with ethnic Tamils, before president Chandrika Kumaratunga overruled him. Several rounds of talks ended in October 2006, leaving in shreds the truce Norway brokered in 2002. Except for a lull in the December 2004 tsunami aftermath, fighting has continued and threatens to bring back gruesome episodes of suicide bombing, massacre, rape and torture. The conflict has killed over 65,000 civilians since 1972. Both the government and rebel leaders need help to halt the madness.

The antagonists, adequately armed to fight but not to vanquish each other, should by now realise there is no military solution. Partition is out of the question. So is persecution of minorities. The long-term answer is political accommodation through constitutional arrangements that guarantee minority self-rule. But first, hostilities must stop, once again with outside help. The United Nations should step in to help or take over from Norway, which lacks the capacity to enforce a ceasefire. Norwegian efforts, including confidence building and human rights monitoring, did succeed in moderating the conflict before the present breakdown. They point the way forward. With international guarantees and, if need be, a peace-keeping force on the ground, the two sides could refocus on working out devolutionary measures that put regional government in the hands of regional leaders. Constitutional reform also has to include provisions to require leaders in Colombo to take into account minority interests rather than allow them to exploit ethnic fears to build chauvinistic political support.

To avoid forestalling a compromise, Sri Lankan diaspora donors - among 700,000 Tamils and 400,000 to 500,000 Sinhalese abroad - should stop financing the conflict. Their support and influence serve only to harden both sides' positions. Ultimately, it is political leadership within an inclusive constitutional framework that will save Sri Lanka. Sinhalese leaders need to resist ethnic and religious insistence on marginalising the Tamil community. The Tamil Tigers should on their part accept that an independent Eelam is unrealistic and settle for a guaranteed political accommodation.

Sri Lanka update - 12 Jan 2008

Saturday, 12 January 2008, 11:01 GMT


Sri Lanka claims 59 rebel deaths
By Roland Buerk
BBC News, Colombo


Fifty-nine Tamil Tiger rebels have been killed in the latest fighting in Sri Lanka, the military said, adding that one of its soldiers was also killed.

However, the Tigers, who want an independent state for the Tamil minority, have dismissed the figures.

They have accused the government of making false claims of victories to retain the support of the Sinhalese majority in the south.

The government is to formally pull out of a 2002 ceasefire deal on 16 January.

The pace of fighting in Sri Lanka has picked up since the government gave notice it was abandoning the ceasefire with the Tamil Tigers.

Heavy price

As on earlier days, the battles continued on Friday on the frontlines that fringe rebel-held territory in the north.

A spokesman for the military said 59 Tiger fighters had been killed as well as one soldier.

But the head of the rebels' Peace Secretariat, S Puleedevan, accused Sri Lanka's Ministry of Defence of putting out false propaganda, saying if their figures were to be believed there would not be a single Tamil left on the island.

He said soldiers were trying to push across the frontlines but were being repulsed with casualties.

With the ceasefire formally coming to an end next week there is likely to be a further escalation in the conflict.

The commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, has said his aim is to eliminate the Tigers before he leaves office at the end of the year.

But the rebels say they are ready for all-out war, with Mr Puleedevan warning if soldiers take one step into Tiger-controlled territory they would pay a heavy price.

India-China War Games

India and China launch war games


India and China have begun a landmark joint military exercise, the first of its kind between the two largest armies in the world.
The exercise is taking place between 20 and 28 December in China's south-western province of Yunnan.

It involves a company - just over 100 officers and men - from each side.

India and China fought a brief but bloody border war in 1962 and observers say the largely symbolic exercise is to boost historically frosty relations.

The BBC's Sanjoy Majumder in Delhi says after years of mistrust both sides are beginning to benefit from increased trade and their governments are coming under increasing pressure from business leaders to improve ties.

"The joint training is aimed at enhancing understanding and mutual trust between Chinese and Indian armies and strengthening their exchanges in the anti-terror areas," a statement issued by the foreign office of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence said.

It is also aimed at deterring the 'three evil forces' - separatists, extremists and terrorists - and promoting the strategic partnership for peace and prosperity between China and India."

Indian troops taking part have been picked from forces fighting insurgencies in restive north-eastern India and Indian-administered Kashmir, reports said.

Indian forces are carrying their personal weapons, light machine guns and mortars. The armoury - tanks, helicopter gunships and unmanned aerial vehicles - are being provided by the Chinese army.


Analysts say the exercise will bolster ties between the two countries.

"It will definitely help strengthen the mutual trust between the two countries, and the militaries in particular, given that they have an episode of unpleasant history," Sun Shihai, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences told the BBC.

Swaran Singh, associate professor at the School of International Studies at Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University, said: "This reflects the growing mutual trust and understanding between the two sides, including between their military establishments."

'Intrusions'
Ties between the two countries remained tense after the brief war in 1962.

During an Indian high altitude military exercise called Operation Chequerboard in 1987, the two armies nearly went to war again.

In between, both sides patrolled the desolate frontier aggressively and skirmishes were not infrequent.

The situation eased after the two countries signed a treaty for peace and tranquillity in 1993, agreeing to reduce troop levels on the borders.

India and China signed an agreement on defence cooperation in May 2006 during the visit of former Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to China.

Since then the two countries have been sending officers to each other's military institutions for training, and military delegations have been visiting each other on a regular basis.

Last year, China agreed to reopen the strategic Nathu La pass to border trade, thereby accepting Sikkim as a part of India.
But in the last year China appeared to be uncomfortable with India's growing strategic ties with the US, cemented through a series of joint exercises, including the huge five-nation naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, this year.

In recent months, Indian forces reported more and more Chinese "intrusions" across the disputed border even as Beijing stepped up its rhetoric over the disputed frontier, reiterating its claims to the north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

Analysts say the visit of India's governing Congress party chief Sonia Gandhi to China last month has helped put bilateral relations back on the right track.

For its part, China, a long-term ally of Pakistan, appears no longer to object to India's civilian nuclear deal with the US.

But other sources of suspicion remain, among them China's influence in India's neighbour Burma and India's hosting of the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.

Chinese 'border gesture' to India
By Subir Bhaumik
BBC News, Calcutta 7 Dec 2007

China appears to have reversed its long-held policy of refusing to give visas to Indians from the disputed Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
It has now allowed a professor from the state - in the north-east of the country - to visit China.

Beijing has over much of the last four decades been claiming Arunachal Pradesh as its own territory.

During the 1962 war with India, Chinese troops overran large parts of the state, before withdrawing to Tibet.

It has emerged that this week the Chinese embassy in Delhi granted a visa to Marpe Sora, a professor in computer science at the Rajiv Gandhi university in Arunachal's capital, Itanagar.




Diplomats and analysts feel this gesture may be a prelude to China ultimately accepting Arunachal Pradesh as part of India.

China opposed the Indian takeover of the state of Sikkim in 1975, and did not recognise it to be Indian for more than 20 years.

Chinese maps now show Sikkim as a part of India, but much of Arunachal Pradesh is still shown to be part of China.

Mr Marpe Sora has already left for China with some other Indian professors for a programme conducted by the India-China Alliance Centre, officials said.

They said Mr Sora belongs to one of the local tribes of Arunachal Pradesh.

Officials say he will visit the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing and several other institutes as part of his trip.

Earlier this year, China refused a visa to Ganesh Koyu, an Arunachal Pradesh local and an officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS).

Mr Koyu was part of a delegation of 100 IAS officers due to visit China.

China said that since they considered Arunachal Pradesh to be a part of China, Mr Koyu would not need a visa to visit his "own country".

Upset with Beijing's decision, the Indian government cancelled the trip of the entire IAS delegation.

In 1983, China refused to grant a visa to Arunachal Pradesh resident T Rajkumar, who was then speaker of the state's legislative assembly.

Earlier this month China agreed to withdraw its objections to the India-US nuclear deal after months of uncertainty triggered by its suspicions of the agreement.

The Chinese army has also decided to hold its first joint military exercise with the Indian army at Chengdu later this month, with a special focus on anti-terrorist drills.

Tuesday, 8 January 2008, 12:05 GMT

A grim future foretold for Sri Lanka
By Ethirajan Anbarasan
BBC News

Violence is a daily occurrence in Sri Lanka

It had been widely predicted that "2008 would be the year of war for Sri Lanka". The current escalation of violence since 1 January supports those fears.

Scores of Tamil rebels and soldiers have been reported killed in heavy fighting in four fronts of northern Sri Lanka in recent days.

The rebels are offering fierce resistance to the army and there are intermittent battles at sea as well.

A government minister was killed on Tuesday near the capital, Colombo. The government are sure it was the work of the Tigers.

On Sunday the Tigers' intelligence chief, Col Charles, was killed in the north, only two months after SP Thamilselvan, the Tiger's political wing leader, was killed in an air raid in the north.

Denials

The New Year gloom intensified when the government announced that it was officially withdrawing from the Norwegian-brokered 2002 ceasefire agreement.

With some 5,000 people killed in the last two years, the ceasefire was nothing more than a piece of paper. Now there are fears that a full-fledged conflict is on the cards.

"The Sri Lankan government will intensify and expedite its war preparations," says Sri Lankan analyst DBS Jeyaraj.


Sri Lanka is a country where the official statements of the military and the rebels often appear to have little bearing on reality.
Thousands of people have been displaced due to the fighting

"Whenever our forces are attacked, we respond. We are not conducting any major military offensive," military spokesman, Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara, told the BBC.

The Sri Lankan government also insists that it has not closed the doors for talks and that it wants to militarily weaken the rebels before entering into any peace negotiations.

One worrying development for human rights is that the Nordic ceasefire monitors, whose mission was set up as part of the 2002 agreement, will no longer have a role to play.

Soon, there will be no independent officials to investigate the violence, making it even harder to verify the claims and counter-claims of the two sides.

Waning interest

The government's decision to abrogate the ceasefire agreement has disappointed major international powers, including neighbouring India.

"We strongly believe that there is no military solution to the issue," an Indian government spokesman said after the Sri Lankan government's announcement on terminating the ceasefire.

International interest in the ethnic conflict now seems to be waning.

Western nations, including the US, had strongly backed the Norwegian-backed peace process.


Heavy fighting is going on in the north

Now their options appear to be limited. Their calls for restraint seem to be having no effect.


From previous experience, the Tamil Tiger rebels can be expected to put up a tough fight, but many doubt their ability to hold on to territory in any protracted confrontations.

The numerically superior government forces might try to inch their way into rebel territory as they did in eastern Sri Lanka last year.

The government claims that their aerial bombardments are also inflicting serious damage to rebel positions elsewhere.

Even abroad the Tamil Tigers have come under pressure.


Their actions in Europe and in the US have come under intense scrutiny and many of their senior representatives have been held in custody under various charges.

Back home the political process is in limbo.

The government had announced the formation of an all-party group in 2006 to discuss a political solution to the war.

The final draft of the proposals is still under discussion and the delay is worrying the Tamil community.

Civilians ignored

As is so often the case in Sri Lanka, it's the civilians that seem to be worst hit.

There are reports of many civilian casualties in government air raids in the north. And civilians are often caught up in Tamil Tiger bomb attacks.

Thousands have been displaced from their homes and there is no sign that many of them will be able to return home.

There are already more than 5,000 civilians displaced in the recent fighting in the north.


Civilians are the hardest hit

Some of them are afraid that they may not be allowed to go back to their homes even if the fighting ends.

They point out that while major clashes ceased in the east some months ago, more than 20,000 civilians are still scattered in various camps for displaced people.

In addition, thousands of civilians, especially Tamils, are living under fear in Colombo and in other areas.

Hundreds of Tamils are routinely rounded up in security sweeps and many are afraid they are being unfairly punished in response to the violence in the north.

Scared

"There will be crackdown, mass arrests, expulsions etc of Tamil civilians in Colombo and other places in the south," says analyst DBS Jeyaraj.

"If the rebels carry out an operation in the south it will be used to justify repression in the name of security."

Even Tamil politicians are scared of staying in Colombo.

On this New Year's Day a Tamil lawmaker from the main opposition, T Maheswaran, was gunned down in a Hindu temple in broad daylight in front of many civilians.

Another Tamil lawmaker, Mano Ganesan, a human rights campaigner, has left the country for safety reasons.


All in all, the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka are looking more bleak than ever.


Thursday, 10 January 2008, 11:57 GMT

Tamil Tigers in ceasefire appeal

The Tigers have suffered serious setbacks in recent months
Tamil Tiger rebels in Sri Lanka say they are prepared to fully implement the terms of a 2002 ceasefire, although the government is pulling out of it.
The government's commitment to the ceasefire formally ends on 16 January. In practice, it has fallen apart in the last two years.

Both sides have been accused of repeatedly breaching it and also committing human rights abuses.

The Tamil Tigers have suffered major setbacks in the past 12 months.

'Shocked'

On 2 January the government gave two weeks notice of its intention to end the ceasefire.


A government minister was killed near Colombo this week

Now the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) have issued a formal response.

"We are shocked and disappointed," a statement from the new head of the Tigers' political wing, B Nadesan said.

"The GoSL [government of Sri Lanka], without any justifications, has now unilaterally withdrawn from the CFA [ceasefire agreement].

"The LTTE wishes to state that even at this juncture, it is ready to implement every clause of the CFA agreement and respect it 100%," Mr Nadesan said.

The 2002 ceasefire was brokered by Norway. Mr Nadesan also requested "that Norway should continue with its facilitation role with the support of the international community".

'We will face it'

It is not clear why it has taken the Tigers more than a week to respond to the government's ceasefire withdrawal.

A leading rebel, S Puleedevan, told Reuters news agency that "if full-scale war is thrust upon us, we will face it".

The Tigers - listed as a terrorist organisation in the United States and the European Union - also called on the international community to reconsider the bans on them.

In the past two years some 5,000 people have been killed, despite both sides having professed their commitment to the ceasefire.

The Tamil Tigers have staged some high-profile attacks, including using air power last year for the first time.

This week a government minister was killed in a bomb attack near Colombo.

But the government has driven the Tigers from their strongholds in the east of the island and has been claiming sustained successes in the north.

Leading rebels have been killed, including SP Thamilselvan who headed their political wing for years.

At least 70,000 people have been killed in the conflict since it began in 1983.

The government has ruled out any more negotiations unless the Tigers lay down their arms first. It has also vowed to crush the rebels militarily.

The pace of fighting has stepped up in recent days on the frontlines that surround rebel-held territory in the north of the island where they run a civil administration.