CYCLONE NARGIS AFTERMATH
Asean bridges the differences
By Rodolfo C. Severino, For The Straits Times
May 22, 2008
ASEAN foreign ministers met in Singapore earlier this week to discuss the situation in Myanmar following the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis. They had set out to do three things.
First, they were to update one another on the situation.
Second, they were to hear the report of the Asean Emergency Rapid Assessment Team that had been working in Myanmar since May 9.
Third, they were to coordinate the assistance that several Asean member countries had extended to Myanmar. They were also to see how Asean aid could fit into the larger international effort, an effort that itself needed coordination.
A fourth purpose of the ministers' meeting, in the minds of many, was to see how Asean could help sort out the disagreements between the United States and some European countries, on one side, and the Myanmar government, on the other, over the role of foreign nationals, including military personnel, within the Irrawaddy delta disaster area.
The donor governments were insisting that their own people handle the aid distribution. But the Myanmar authorities seemed to be suspicious of the political motives of the donor governments, many of which had been expressing hostility towards them for years.
The Asean ministers' meeting did succeed on all these counts. Nevertheless, the observation of some that the meeting should have taken place earlier was valid.
Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo himself acknowledged this.
'We wished it could have been done sooner,' he said. 'But given the magnitude of the disaster and the decisions taken by the (Myanmar) government, we are happy to have reached this point today. Better late than never.'
The ministers heard from their Myanmar colleague not only a report on the situation and the extent of the damage, but also of his government's positions on the issues raised by Asean and others in the international community.
The ministers also received the report from the Emergency Rapid Assessment Team. It recommended closer coordination between aid workers and the Myanmar government, the deployment of specialised equipment and personnel from the global community, the immediate delivery of building materials and a mechanism for the urgent supply of clean water.
The team also called for the immediate provision of health care, ensuring the capacity of the farmers in the Irrawaddy delta to plant and harvest rice, and the quick establishment of temporary schools.
Mr Yeo, who chaired the meeting, said at its conclusion: 'Myanmar is...prepared to accept the expertise of the international and regional agencies to help in its rehabilitation efforts.' But he warned: 'International assistance to Myanmar, given through Asean, should not be politicised. On that basis, Myanmar will accept international assistance.'
The ministers agreed to set up a task force, headed by Asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, to 'work closely' with the United Nations and the Myanmar government in an 'Asean-led mechanism'.
On the same day the ministers met, Asean and the UN announced they would jointly convene a ministerial-level pledging conference in Yangon on Sunday.
The Asean ministers succeeded, late though they may have been, in taking the lead in the global effort to help the victims of Cyclone Nargis. They seem to have broken the impasse between the political imperatives of some donor states and the suspicious outlook of the Myanmar authorities.
Asean is mobilising the modest resources of its member countries and taking the lead in coordinating the substantial contributions of the rest of the international community.
----------------
CYCLONE NARGIS AFTERMATH
Tugging on the world's conscience
By Hannah Ruth Chia, For The Straits Times
AFTER years of blissful ignorance, the world finally woke up to the situation in Myanmar last year, when its people, led by the country's monks, took to the streets to protest against the military junta that has ruled with an iron fist for more than 40 years.
The junta responded swiftly, and the rebellion was crushed. Even the monks, so revered in Myanmar society, were not spared. The world then forgot about Myanmar - until Cyclone Nargis struck with such force on May 3.
The catastrophe that has hit Myanmar and its aftermath were no different from any other such disasters. Countries pledged aid and made plans to send relief workers.
However, even with some 100,000 people dead and an estimated two million in desperate need of help, the country's ruling junta, led by 75-year-old Senior General Than Shwe, decided to reject visa applications for disaster experts and aid workers.
Flights bringing food and medical supplies were turned away because there were reporters and aid workers on board. Food cargo from the World Food Programme was impounded.
Aid workers who were in the country before the cyclone struck are working hard to distribute aid, but a lack of manpower and logistical problems mean that relief has reached only a quarter of those who need it.
TIMELY REMINDER
The world should remember the international doctrine of the 'Responsibility to Protect' or R2P...One of the two basic principles of the R2P is: 'Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.'
Up until Monday, the junta was insisting that it wanted only cash and aid, not personnel. Visas are still pending for dozens of aid workers waiting in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. While more aid and aid workers are finally being allowed in, their numbers are not large enough to cope with a calamity of this scale.
In the meantime, the junta went ahead with a referendum for a new Constitution on May 10, although it did delay the vote in areas affected by the cyclone.
Military trucks, which could have been used to deliver aid, were instead seen driving through the streets urging people to vote in favour of the new Constitution.
The estimated half a million soldiers in the Myanmar military who were rapidly deployed during last year's protests are sparse on the ground. Instead, civilians and monks are helping with most of the humanitarian efforts.
Perhaps the junta, holed up in its remote capital of Naypyidaw, has not fully grasped the scale of the crisis.
The more likely explanation is that it is more concerned with cementing its power. Its rejection of foreign disaster experts and aid workers is merely a manifestation of its xenophobia.
Asean, of which Myanmar is a member, had, until recently, remained largely silent on the junta's rejection of outside help. Individual governments expressed concern, and the Thai government was fashioned into an intermediary between the military junta and the international community.
Individual states such as Singapore and Thailand sent aid, which was accepted by the junta.
Although Myanmar allowed a team of disaster experts from Asean into the country to assess the damage last week, millions of lives remain at risk.
The last time Asean members were faced with a natural disaster of this scale was the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. The governments of the affected countries, including Indonesia, readily admitted that they needed help and opened their doors to external aid.
Singapore called for a regional summit to discuss long-term infrastructure development in the devastated areas. The summit produced real results.
Even as more accounts of the abuse of international aid came out of Myanmar, Asean foreign ministers met in Singapore earlier this week to 'discuss the humanitarian situation in Myanmar and consider how best to assist Myanmar in its relief and recovery efforts'. Myanmar's Foreign Minister, Mr Nyan Win, was at the meeting.
Some progress was made, with Myanmar agreeing to allow international aid into the country through Asean. It was also announced that Asean medical teams would be allowed into the country immediately.
While this is a positive step, the responsibility to channel international aid into Myanmar falls upon just nine countries, some of which are not rich or developed enough for the enormous task.
The capacity of Asean to provide urgent medical aid and recovery in order to avoid a looming health catastrophe is questionable.
Additionally, the military junta in Myanmar would remain in control of the distribution of aid.
With some 2-1/2 million people still in urgent need of help, it remains to be seen if the aid will reach all of them.
The international community remains divided over how best to handle the crisis.
The United States and some members of the European Union - including the Britain, France, Germany and Denmark - have not ruled out 'humanitarian intervention'.
But this could exacerbate the situation and make life worse for those who accept the aid. It could also lead to some form of military crackdown or cause the junta to close the borders completely.
Asean remains opposed to forced delivery of aid, largely due to its principle of non-intervention in the affairs of its member states.
But if the situation in Myanmar does not improve despite Asean's efforts - and if Asean is seen to be unwilling to act more forcefully - it could find itself being undermined by extra-regional powers, should those powers decide to go ahead with forced intervention, regardless of the grouping's position on the matter.
The world should remember the international doctrine of the 'Responsibility to Protect', or R2P, which all member states of the United Nations reached consensus on in 2005.
One of the two basic principles of the R2P is: 'Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.'
We must recognise that even as limited progress is being made, and the disaster moves away from the front pages of newspapers - where the Myanmar tragedy has already been displaced by the Chinese earthquake - more people are at risk from disease and starvation in Myanmar.
The situation is such that it may be more prudent to act now and ask the theoretical questions later.
The writer is a research analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
The writer, a former Asean secretary-general, is head of the Asean Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Monday, May 26, 2008
ASEAN Bridges the DIfferences - ST
CYCLONE NARGIS AFTERMATH
Asean bridges the differences
By Rodolfo C. Severino, For The Straits Times
May 22, 2008
ASEAN foreign ministers met in Singapore earlier this week to discuss the situation in Myanmar following the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis. They had set out to do three things.
First, they were to update one another on the situation.
Second, they were to hear the report of the Asean Emergency Rapid Assessment Team that had been working in Myanmar since May 9.
Third, they were to coordinate the assistance that several Asean member countries had extended to Myanmar. They were also to see how Asean aid could fit into the larger international effort, an effort that itself needed coordination.
A fourth purpose of the ministers' meeting, in the minds of many, was to see how Asean could help sort out the disagreements between the United States and some European countries, on one side, and the Myanmar government, on the other, over the role of foreign nationals, including military personnel, within the Irrawaddy delta disaster area.
The donor governments were insisting that their own people handle the aid distribution. But the Myanmar authorities seemed to be suspicious of the political motives of the donor governments, many of which had been expressing hostility towards them for years.
The Asean ministers' meeting did succeed on all these counts. Nevertheless, the observation of some that the meeting should have taken place earlier was valid.
Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo himself acknowledged this.
'We wished it could have been done sooner,' he said. 'But given the magnitude of the disaster and the decisions taken by the (Myanmar) government, we are happy to have reached this point today. Better late than never.'
The ministers heard from their Myanmar colleague not only a report on the situation and the extent of the damage, but also of his government's positions on the issues raised by Asean and others in the international community.
The ministers also received the report from the Emergency Rapid Assessment Team. It recommended closer coordination between aid workers and the Myanmar government, the deployment of specialised equipment and personnel from the global community, the immediate delivery of building materials and a mechanism for the urgent supply of clean water.
The team also called for the immediate provision of health care, ensuring the capacity of the farmers in the Irrawaddy delta to plant and harvest rice, and the quick establishment of temporary schools.
Mr Yeo, who chaired the meeting, said at its conclusion: 'Myanmar is...prepared to accept the expertise of the international and regional agencies to help in its rehabilitation efforts.' But he warned: 'International assistance to Myanmar, given through Asean, should not be politicised. On that basis, Myanmar will accept international assistance.'
The ministers agreed to set up a task force, headed by Asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, to 'work closely' with the United Nations and the Myanmar government in an 'Asean-led mechanism'.
On the same day the ministers met, Asean and the UN announced they would jointly convene a ministerial-level pledging conference in Yangon on Sunday.
The Asean ministers succeeded, late though they may have been, in taking the lead in the global effort to help the victims of Cyclone Nargis. They seem to have broken the impasse between the political imperatives of some donor states and the suspicious outlook of the Myanmar authorities.
Asean is mobilising the modest resources of its member countries and taking the lead in coordinating the substantial contributions of the rest of the international community.
The writer, a former Asean secretary-general, is head of the Asean Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Asean bridges the differences
By Rodolfo C. Severino, For The Straits Times
May 22, 2008
ASEAN foreign ministers met in Singapore earlier this week to discuss the situation in Myanmar following the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis. They had set out to do three things.
First, they were to update one another on the situation.
Second, they were to hear the report of the Asean Emergency Rapid Assessment Team that had been working in Myanmar since May 9.
Third, they were to coordinate the assistance that several Asean member countries had extended to Myanmar. They were also to see how Asean aid could fit into the larger international effort, an effort that itself needed coordination.
A fourth purpose of the ministers' meeting, in the minds of many, was to see how Asean could help sort out the disagreements between the United States and some European countries, on one side, and the Myanmar government, on the other, over the role of foreign nationals, including military personnel, within the Irrawaddy delta disaster area.
The donor governments were insisting that their own people handle the aid distribution. But the Myanmar authorities seemed to be suspicious of the political motives of the donor governments, many of which had been expressing hostility towards them for years.
The Asean ministers' meeting did succeed on all these counts. Nevertheless, the observation of some that the meeting should have taken place earlier was valid.
Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo himself acknowledged this.
'We wished it could have been done sooner,' he said. 'But given the magnitude of the disaster and the decisions taken by the (Myanmar) government, we are happy to have reached this point today. Better late than never.'
The ministers heard from their Myanmar colleague not only a report on the situation and the extent of the damage, but also of his government's positions on the issues raised by Asean and others in the international community.
The ministers also received the report from the Emergency Rapid Assessment Team. It recommended closer coordination between aid workers and the Myanmar government, the deployment of specialised equipment and personnel from the global community, the immediate delivery of building materials and a mechanism for the urgent supply of clean water.
The team also called for the immediate provision of health care, ensuring the capacity of the farmers in the Irrawaddy delta to plant and harvest rice, and the quick establishment of temporary schools.
Mr Yeo, who chaired the meeting, said at its conclusion: 'Myanmar is...prepared to accept the expertise of the international and regional agencies to help in its rehabilitation efforts.' But he warned: 'International assistance to Myanmar, given through Asean, should not be politicised. On that basis, Myanmar will accept international assistance.'
The ministers agreed to set up a task force, headed by Asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, to 'work closely' with the United Nations and the Myanmar government in an 'Asean-led mechanism'.
On the same day the ministers met, Asean and the UN announced they would jointly convene a ministerial-level pledging conference in Yangon on Sunday.
The Asean ministers succeeded, late though they may have been, in taking the lead in the global effort to help the victims of Cyclone Nargis. They seem to have broken the impasse between the political imperatives of some donor states and the suspicious outlook of the Myanmar authorities.
Asean is mobilising the modest resources of its member countries and taking the lead in coordinating the substantial contributions of the rest of the international community.
The writer, a former Asean secretary-general, is head of the Asean Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Dissent threatens Shangri-La
May 20, 2008
THE TIBET ISSUE
Dissent threatens Shangri-La
By Nicholas D. Kristof
XIAHE (CHINA) - A TIBETAN monk, recently out of jail and still in pain from beatings by the police, said he reveres the Dalai Lama, but also regards him as a political failure.
'We think the Dalai Lama has been too peaceful,' he said. 'There is a big discussion now about whether we should turn to violence.'
Another monk at Labrang Monastery here in Xiahe, on the Tibetan plateau, put it this way: 'For 50 years, the Dalai Lama said to use peaceful means to solve the problems, and that achieved nothing. China just criticises him. After he is gone, there definitely will be violent resistance.'
This impatience seems widespread among young Tibetans, and the rioting and protests across ethnic Tibetan areas of China in the past few months may be a turning point. Unless the Tibet question is resolved, we may see a Tibetan equivalent of the Irish Republican Army or Hamas.
A crackdown is under way in greater Tibet, as I found when I slipped into the area in the back of a car with local licence plates.
China's heavy hand is adding to the antagonism: The authorities are confiscating pictures of the Dalai Lama, beating and forcing monks to attend 'patriotic study' classes - up to two hours a day, six days a week - full of propaganda praising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and denouncing the exiled spiritual leader.
'That just turns us against China more than ever,' one monk said.
The gulf between Tibetans and the Han Chinese ethnic majority has never been greater. Television images of Tibetans in Lhasa attacking Chinese civilians - devoid of any context of decades of repression - left many Chinese more hardline than the CCP.
'Most of us think the policy towards Tibetans has been too soft,' said a Han Chinese man in Qinghai province who often travels in Tibetan areas.
'They get all kinds of special preferences, but they are just not as hardworking, and they drink too much.
' And then after we help them so much, they riot against us. So most of us think the policy towards Tibetans should be stricter.'
The recent uprising by Tibetans underscores the utter failure of Beijing's policies in Tibet. But it also reflects the failure of the Dalai Lama and of the United States.
The Dalai Lama has played a waiting game, but as China gains global power - and as more Han Chinese flood into Tibet - that has been a losing strategy. The Dalai Lama has won acclaim internationally, but that only triggers the deep Chinese sensitivity to foreign bullying and has thus antagonised the audience that may count the most: China.
The Dalai Lama missed some opportunities by neglecting outreach by then general secretary Hu Yaobang in 1981, by spurning an invitation to China in 1989 and by announcing the choice of the Panchen Lama in a way that Beijing felt insulting.
When the Dalai Lama and those around him refer to 'genocide' or claim roughly one-quarter of China as Tibet, they also undercut Chinese moderates.
As for the US, it may have made things worse.
Mr Melvyn Goldstein of Case Western Reserve University, whose book The Snow Lion And The Dragon remains the best introduction to Tibet, writes that the US has hurt the interests of Tibetans: Its symbolic gestures have encouraged unrealistic Tibetan dreams of independence, and Washington has neglected the serious diplomatic work - both with China and the Dalai Lama - that might actually improve the lives of Tibetans.
China and the Dalai Lama both exaggerate, and the historical evidence on Tibet is contradictory. One can make a good case that Tibet has been a part of China since 1720. One can also make a good case that Tibet became independent around 1911. The evidence is simply mixed.
A deal to resolve the Tibet question is still attainable. The Dalai Lama would have to put aside claims to vast areas outside the present Tibet Autonomous Region and accept much less political autonomy than he wants.
China would have to ease religious controls and allow the Dalai Lama to return as a spiritual leader. Most important, Beijing would have to end Han Chinese migration to all Tibetan areas to preserve their Tibetan character.
The upshot would be a Tibet under China's thumb, but with greater religious freedom - and with real hope of remaining authentically Tibetan through this century. And China would improve its international image and avoid the risk of Tibetan terrorism.
US President George W. Bush would do far more for the Tibetan people if, instead of just being photographed with the Dalai Lama, he assigned a top-notch diplomat like Mr Christopher Hill to explore such a compromise.
But time is running out, for at this rate, Shangri-La may well become a breeding ground for terrorists.
NEW YORK TIMES
THE TIBET ISSUE
Dissent threatens Shangri-La
By Nicholas D. Kristof
XIAHE (CHINA) - A TIBETAN monk, recently out of jail and still in pain from beatings by the police, said he reveres the Dalai Lama, but also regards him as a political failure.
'We think the Dalai Lama has been too peaceful,' he said. 'There is a big discussion now about whether we should turn to violence.'
Another monk at Labrang Monastery here in Xiahe, on the Tibetan plateau, put it this way: 'For 50 years, the Dalai Lama said to use peaceful means to solve the problems, and that achieved nothing. China just criticises him. After he is gone, there definitely will be violent resistance.'
This impatience seems widespread among young Tibetans, and the rioting and protests across ethnic Tibetan areas of China in the past few months may be a turning point. Unless the Tibet question is resolved, we may see a Tibetan equivalent of the Irish Republican Army or Hamas.
A crackdown is under way in greater Tibet, as I found when I slipped into the area in the back of a car with local licence plates.
China's heavy hand is adding to the antagonism: The authorities are confiscating pictures of the Dalai Lama, beating and forcing monks to attend 'patriotic study' classes - up to two hours a day, six days a week - full of propaganda praising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and denouncing the exiled spiritual leader.
'That just turns us against China more than ever,' one monk said.
The gulf between Tibetans and the Han Chinese ethnic majority has never been greater. Television images of Tibetans in Lhasa attacking Chinese civilians - devoid of any context of decades of repression - left many Chinese more hardline than the CCP.
'Most of us think the policy towards Tibetans has been too soft,' said a Han Chinese man in Qinghai province who often travels in Tibetan areas.
'They get all kinds of special preferences, but they are just not as hardworking, and they drink too much.
' And then after we help them so much, they riot against us. So most of us think the policy towards Tibetans should be stricter.'
The recent uprising by Tibetans underscores the utter failure of Beijing's policies in Tibet. But it also reflects the failure of the Dalai Lama and of the United States.
The Dalai Lama has played a waiting game, but as China gains global power - and as more Han Chinese flood into Tibet - that has been a losing strategy. The Dalai Lama has won acclaim internationally, but that only triggers the deep Chinese sensitivity to foreign bullying and has thus antagonised the audience that may count the most: China.
The Dalai Lama missed some opportunities by neglecting outreach by then general secretary Hu Yaobang in 1981, by spurning an invitation to China in 1989 and by announcing the choice of the Panchen Lama in a way that Beijing felt insulting.
When the Dalai Lama and those around him refer to 'genocide' or claim roughly one-quarter of China as Tibet, they also undercut Chinese moderates.
As for the US, it may have made things worse.
Mr Melvyn Goldstein of Case Western Reserve University, whose book The Snow Lion And The Dragon remains the best introduction to Tibet, writes that the US has hurt the interests of Tibetans: Its symbolic gestures have encouraged unrealistic Tibetan dreams of independence, and Washington has neglected the serious diplomatic work - both with China and the Dalai Lama - that might actually improve the lives of Tibetans.
China and the Dalai Lama both exaggerate, and the historical evidence on Tibet is contradictory. One can make a good case that Tibet has been a part of China since 1720. One can also make a good case that Tibet became independent around 1911. The evidence is simply mixed.
A deal to resolve the Tibet question is still attainable. The Dalai Lama would have to put aside claims to vast areas outside the present Tibet Autonomous Region and accept much less political autonomy than he wants.
China would have to ease religious controls and allow the Dalai Lama to return as a spiritual leader. Most important, Beijing would have to end Han Chinese migration to all Tibetan areas to preserve their Tibetan character.
The upshot would be a Tibet under China's thumb, but with greater religious freedom - and with real hope of remaining authentically Tibetan through this century. And China would improve its international image and avoid the risk of Tibetan terrorism.
US President George W. Bush would do far more for the Tibetan people if, instead of just being photographed with the Dalai Lama, he assigned a top-notch diplomat like Mr Christopher Hill to explore such a compromise.
But time is running out, for at this rate, Shangri-La may well become a breeding ground for terrorists.
NEW YORK TIMES
DIVORCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CHILDREN
ST May 20, 2008
DIVORCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CHILDREN
Giving voice to the child's needs
By Chong Chee Kin, Crime Reporter
WHO speaks for the child?
Not his parents, if they are in the midst of a divorce.
Instead, 'the child is used by the parents as a bargaining chip to settle other issues', Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong noted earlier this month.
But from the end of next month, children caught between divorcing parents will get a voice. Under the Child scheme, a counsellor will represent the child, so to speak, during court proceedings.
The counsellor's reports to the court will specify the parents' plans for the child, how feasible these plans are and what the child wants. The counsellor's role is now decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on factors such as when parents file conflicting affidavits, each claiming that the child wishes to be with him or her.
Lawyers say the courts are mindful not to involve a child in legal proceedings. Children, for instance, are not asked to testify against their parents. However, if certain points raised by one parent are not challenged by the other, the true wishes of the child may not be known.
For instance, a father may claim his 10-year-old son has written about how much he wants to live with his dad. With the new system, a counsellor can ascertain the boy's real wishes by interviewing him. This step would lend substance to the Family Courts' paradigm shift - away from the current adversarial system to focus instead on the needs of children.
Getting a divorce in Singapore is a two-stage process.
The courts demand evidence that one party is responsible for the marriage breaking down - for example, due to adultery, cruelty or unreasonable behaviour - before granting a divorce. Often, warring couples point fingers at each other, worsening their mutual hostility.
Another reason for divorce can be separation. A couple can be divorced if both parties agree to live separately for three years. It would take four years if one spouse does not agree.
About three to six months after a divorce is granted, a different judge may be appointed to hear ancillary matters, such as the amount of maintenance to be paid, how to split the couple's assets and arrangements for the child.
Here, the accusations which surface at the first stage may be repeated to bolster claims that one or the other spouse is a bad parent and less deserving to gain custody
The children become 'a commodity in the barter trade that goes on in the court', said Ms Ellen Lee, Member of Parliament (Sembawang GRC) and a family lawyer.
For example, a husband might fight for custody if only to force the wife to reduce her maintenance claim or waive it. Also, the husband might threaten to fight for custody to get the wife to give up her claim on the matrimonial flat.
Some of these claims may arise in the first stage of divorce proceedings and re-surface later.
Mr Patrick Tan, managing partner of Patrick Tan & Associates, said: 'Sometimes, when the accusations are relevant, they will re-surface for custody or maintenance issues. For example, the wife may claim the husband is cruel and abuses the child. But generally, the courts try not to involve the child in such matters.'
Ms Foo Siew Fong, who heads matrimonial practice at Harry Elias Partnership and is president of the Singapore Association of Women's Lawyers, said acrimony will be present as long as couples are unreasonable.
The Family Courts have a wide range of programmes, from counselling to workshops on what is best for children. But there is only so much they can do.
'The courts can facilitate the proceedings and make the process as painless as possible for the families. But they cannot force (couples) from not having their say in court,' said Ms Foo.
While full details of how the new tack would work are not yet known, lawyers say the impact of the changes will be felt most at stage two of divorce proceedings.
A family court judge, assisted by a judicial officer and a counsellor who must be present, will preside over, say, custody battles.
The issue of who is to blame may no longer be resurrected, or at most be kept to the minimum. At this stage, the focus will be on the care and future of the child.
This would be helped by the ban on the multiple affidavits that warring couples file. Instead, the judge will direct couples to file affidavits relevant to parenting issues.
Family lawyer Yap Teong Liang, who chairs the Law Society's Family Law Practice Committee, said: 'Instead of fighting the case through affidavits, as they do now, the couple and their lawyers will need to focus on what they think is best for their children, like their emotional needs, education and development.'
Affidavits can cause intense acrimony. When one party points the finger at the other, the other is compelled to rebut and fight the claim.
The affidavits - 'womb to tomb' in their coverage, as the Chief Justice noted - at times detail minute events in the past to show how bad the other parent is. Often, the allegations are irrelevant.
Mr Yap said: 'In cases where one parent claims the other is negligent because she forgets to feed the child, the allegation is not relevant if the child is a teenager.'
Ms Lee said couples are compelled to rebut the allegations under the adversarial system: 'Sometimes, they would ask the children, 'Do you remember mummy doing this or that to you?'. Most of the time, the children do not even remember, but because the statements come from their parents, they feel that the parents must be right.'
The divorce rate is rising - from 5,733 in 2005 to 5,937 last year. So, too, the number of divorces involving children - 2,845 cases last year, up from 2,673 in 2005.
We do not know if the divorce rate will fall. But at the very least, this new move by the Family Courts may lessen the trauma for children caught in the middle.
Couples may break up. But there is no reason why their children should be broken in the process.
cheekin@sph.com.sg
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARENTAL PRESSURE
'Sometimes, they would ask the children, 'Do you remember mummy doing this or that to you?'. Most of the time, the children do not even remember, but because the statements come from their parents, they feel that the parents must be right.'
MS ELLEN LEE, Member of Parliament and family lawyer
DIVORCE AND ITS IMPACT ON CHILDREN
Giving voice to the child's needs
By Chong Chee Kin, Crime Reporter
WHO speaks for the child?
Not his parents, if they are in the midst of a divorce.
Instead, 'the child is used by the parents as a bargaining chip to settle other issues', Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong noted earlier this month.
But from the end of next month, children caught between divorcing parents will get a voice. Under the Child scheme, a counsellor will represent the child, so to speak, during court proceedings.
The counsellor's reports to the court will specify the parents' plans for the child, how feasible these plans are and what the child wants. The counsellor's role is now decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on factors such as when parents file conflicting affidavits, each claiming that the child wishes to be with him or her.
Lawyers say the courts are mindful not to involve a child in legal proceedings. Children, for instance, are not asked to testify against their parents. However, if certain points raised by one parent are not challenged by the other, the true wishes of the child may not be known.
For instance, a father may claim his 10-year-old son has written about how much he wants to live with his dad. With the new system, a counsellor can ascertain the boy's real wishes by interviewing him. This step would lend substance to the Family Courts' paradigm shift - away from the current adversarial system to focus instead on the needs of children.
Getting a divorce in Singapore is a two-stage process.
The courts demand evidence that one party is responsible for the marriage breaking down - for example, due to adultery, cruelty or unreasonable behaviour - before granting a divorce. Often, warring couples point fingers at each other, worsening their mutual hostility.
Another reason for divorce can be separation. A couple can be divorced if both parties agree to live separately for three years. It would take four years if one spouse does not agree.
About three to six months after a divorce is granted, a different judge may be appointed to hear ancillary matters, such as the amount of maintenance to be paid, how to split the couple's assets and arrangements for the child.
Here, the accusations which surface at the first stage may be repeated to bolster claims that one or the other spouse is a bad parent and less deserving to gain custody
The children become 'a commodity in the barter trade that goes on in the court', said Ms Ellen Lee, Member of Parliament (Sembawang GRC) and a family lawyer.
For example, a husband might fight for custody if only to force the wife to reduce her maintenance claim or waive it. Also, the husband might threaten to fight for custody to get the wife to give up her claim on the matrimonial flat.
Some of these claims may arise in the first stage of divorce proceedings and re-surface later.
Mr Patrick Tan, managing partner of Patrick Tan & Associates, said: 'Sometimes, when the accusations are relevant, they will re-surface for custody or maintenance issues. For example, the wife may claim the husband is cruel and abuses the child. But generally, the courts try not to involve the child in such matters.'
Ms Foo Siew Fong, who heads matrimonial practice at Harry Elias Partnership and is president of the Singapore Association of Women's Lawyers, said acrimony will be present as long as couples are unreasonable.
The Family Courts have a wide range of programmes, from counselling to workshops on what is best for children. But there is only so much they can do.
'The courts can facilitate the proceedings and make the process as painless as possible for the families. But they cannot force (couples) from not having their say in court,' said Ms Foo.
While full details of how the new tack would work are not yet known, lawyers say the impact of the changes will be felt most at stage two of divorce proceedings.
A family court judge, assisted by a judicial officer and a counsellor who must be present, will preside over, say, custody battles.
The issue of who is to blame may no longer be resurrected, or at most be kept to the minimum. At this stage, the focus will be on the care and future of the child.
This would be helped by the ban on the multiple affidavits that warring couples file. Instead, the judge will direct couples to file affidavits relevant to parenting issues.
Family lawyer Yap Teong Liang, who chairs the Law Society's Family Law Practice Committee, said: 'Instead of fighting the case through affidavits, as they do now, the couple and their lawyers will need to focus on what they think is best for their children, like their emotional needs, education and development.'
Affidavits can cause intense acrimony. When one party points the finger at the other, the other is compelled to rebut and fight the claim.
The affidavits - 'womb to tomb' in their coverage, as the Chief Justice noted - at times detail minute events in the past to show how bad the other parent is. Often, the allegations are irrelevant.
Mr Yap said: 'In cases where one parent claims the other is negligent because she forgets to feed the child, the allegation is not relevant if the child is a teenager.'
Ms Lee said couples are compelled to rebut the allegations under the adversarial system: 'Sometimes, they would ask the children, 'Do you remember mummy doing this or that to you?'. Most of the time, the children do not even remember, but because the statements come from their parents, they feel that the parents must be right.'
The divorce rate is rising - from 5,733 in 2005 to 5,937 last year. So, too, the number of divorces involving children - 2,845 cases last year, up from 2,673 in 2005.
We do not know if the divorce rate will fall. But at the very least, this new move by the Family Courts may lessen the trauma for children caught in the middle.
Couples may break up. But there is no reason why their children should be broken in the process.
cheekin@sph.com.sg
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARENTAL PRESSURE
'Sometimes, they would ask the children, 'Do you remember mummy doing this or that to you?'. Most of the time, the children do not even remember, but because the statements come from their parents, they feel that the parents must be right.'
MS ELLEN LEE, Member of Parliament and family lawyer
Pedra Branca - MFA Website
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/pedraBranca/
Background
What is Pedra Branca?
Pedra Branca is an island that sits at the eastern entrance of the Straits of Singapore. It lies about 24 nautical miles to the east of Singapore.
Its location has long been of strategic importance to us as it commands the entire eastern approach to the Straits of Singapore, through which almost 900 ships pass daily.
The oldest feature on the island is Horsburgh Lighthouse, which was built on the island by the British between 1847 and 1851.
What is Singapore’s case with regard to Pedra Branca?
It is Singapore’s case that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore because the British colonial government took possession of the island over 160 years ago to build Horsburgh Lighthouse and other structures on it. At that time, Pedra Branca was uninhabited and it belonged to no one.
Since then, Singapore has continuously and openly conducted acts of a sovereign nature over the entire island and its surrounding waters. In contrast, Malaysia did nothing and did not protest against any of the actions of Singapore.
In 1953, Johor stated in official correspondence with Singapore that it did not claim ownership over Pedra Branca. Malaysia also published a series of official maps from 1962 to 1975 depicting Pedra Branca as belonging to Singapore.
What are Middle Rocks and South Ledge?
Middle Rocks and South Ledge are two maritime features to the south of Pedra Branca. Middle Rocks consists of two clusters of rocks situated 0.6 nautical miles south of Pedra Branca. South Ledge is a low-tide elevation (in other words, it is submerged at high tide) further south, 2.1 nautical miles, of Pedra Branca.
It is Singapore’s case that sovereignty over Middle Rocks and South Ledge belongs to the country that has sovereignty over Pedra Branca.
HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
How did the dispute arise?
The dispute arose in 1979 when Malaysia published a map which claimed the island as hers. In response, Singapore lodged a formal protest with Malaysia, in early 1980.
Why did Singapore and Malaysia decide to put the dispute before the ICJ?
Singapore and Malaysia agree that bringing this matter before the ICJ will remove an irritant from the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Why did this process take so long?
It took slightly more than 20 years, from the time the dispute arose in 1979, for it to be finally brought before the ICJ. This suggestion was first made by Singapore in 1989. Malaysia accepted this proposal in 1994. The two countries agreed on the text of a Special Agreement (a formal agreement that was needed for the submission of this dispute to the ICJ) in 1998. Finally, the Special Agreement was signed on 6th February 2003 by the Foreign Ministers of both countries, and formally notified to the ICJ on 24 July 2003.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISPUTE
What have Singapore and Malaysia requested the ICJ to decide in this dispute?
Singapore and Malaysia have requested the ICJ to determine who has sovereignty over (a) Pedra Branca; (b) Middle Rocks; (c) South Ledge.
What happened after Singapore and Malaysia submitted the Special Agreement to the ICJ in July 2003?
In accordance with the terms of the Special Agreement, the ICJ scheduled three rounds of written pleadings, which were to be exchanged simultaneously. These were duly submitted on 25 March 2004, 25 January 2005 and 25 November 2005.
In May 2006, the ICJ decided that no further written pleadings were required, thus closing the written proceedings phase of the case.
The case then moved to the oral proceedings phase. Both Singapore and Malaysia made oral arguments before the ICJ from 6-23 November 2007. These hearings were open to the public and were held at the ICJ's Seat at the Peace Palace at The Hague (Netherlands).
Transcripts of the speeches are available on the ICJ's website.
How can I obtain more information on the ICJ?
For more information, please see: http://www.icj-cij.org/.
Background
What is Pedra Branca?
Pedra Branca is an island that sits at the eastern entrance of the Straits of Singapore. It lies about 24 nautical miles to the east of Singapore.
Its location has long been of strategic importance to us as it commands the entire eastern approach to the Straits of Singapore, through which almost 900 ships pass daily.
The oldest feature on the island is Horsburgh Lighthouse, which was built on the island by the British between 1847 and 1851.
What is Singapore’s case with regard to Pedra Branca?
It is Singapore’s case that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore because the British colonial government took possession of the island over 160 years ago to build Horsburgh Lighthouse and other structures on it. At that time, Pedra Branca was uninhabited and it belonged to no one.
Since then, Singapore has continuously and openly conducted acts of a sovereign nature over the entire island and its surrounding waters. In contrast, Malaysia did nothing and did not protest against any of the actions of Singapore.
In 1953, Johor stated in official correspondence with Singapore that it did not claim ownership over Pedra Branca. Malaysia also published a series of official maps from 1962 to 1975 depicting Pedra Branca as belonging to Singapore.
What are Middle Rocks and South Ledge?
Middle Rocks and South Ledge are two maritime features to the south of Pedra Branca. Middle Rocks consists of two clusters of rocks situated 0.6 nautical miles south of Pedra Branca. South Ledge is a low-tide elevation (in other words, it is submerged at high tide) further south, 2.1 nautical miles, of Pedra Branca.
It is Singapore’s case that sovereignty over Middle Rocks and South Ledge belongs to the country that has sovereignty over Pedra Branca.
HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
How did the dispute arise?
The dispute arose in 1979 when Malaysia published a map which claimed the island as hers. In response, Singapore lodged a formal protest with Malaysia, in early 1980.
Why did Singapore and Malaysia decide to put the dispute before the ICJ?
Singapore and Malaysia agree that bringing this matter before the ICJ will remove an irritant from the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Why did this process take so long?
It took slightly more than 20 years, from the time the dispute arose in 1979, for it to be finally brought before the ICJ. This suggestion was first made by Singapore in 1989. Malaysia accepted this proposal in 1994. The two countries agreed on the text of a Special Agreement (a formal agreement that was needed for the submission of this dispute to the ICJ) in 1998. Finally, the Special Agreement was signed on 6th February 2003 by the Foreign Ministers of both countries, and formally notified to the ICJ on 24 July 2003.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISPUTE
What have Singapore and Malaysia requested the ICJ to decide in this dispute?
Singapore and Malaysia have requested the ICJ to determine who has sovereignty over (a) Pedra Branca; (b) Middle Rocks; (c) South Ledge.
What happened after Singapore and Malaysia submitted the Special Agreement to the ICJ in July 2003?
In accordance with the terms of the Special Agreement, the ICJ scheduled three rounds of written pleadings, which were to be exchanged simultaneously. These were duly submitted on 25 March 2004, 25 January 2005 and 25 November 2005.
In May 2006, the ICJ decided that no further written pleadings were required, thus closing the written proceedings phase of the case.
The case then moved to the oral proceedings phase. Both Singapore and Malaysia made oral arguments before the ICJ from 6-23 November 2007. These hearings were open to the public and were held at the ICJ's Seat at the Peace Palace at The Hague (Netherlands).
Transcripts of the speeches are available on the ICJ's website.
How can I obtain more information on the ICJ?
For more information, please see: http://www.icj-cij.org/.
Pedra Branca Case
ST May 22, 2008
Ruling for Singapore
SINGAPORE claims sovereignty over Pedra Branca on the basis that the British took lawful possession of the island between 1847 and 1851, when they built Horsburgh Lighthouse there.
Before that, the island was terra nullius, that is, it belonged to no one, Singapore had argued before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Netherlands last November.
Singapore inherited the title to the island from the British colonial government.
It maintained that title through an open, continuous and effective display of state authority over the island from the 1850s up to the present, it said.
Those state activities, known in international law as effectivites, went well beyond the operation of Horsburgh Lighthouse, and included naval patrols in the waters around Pedra Branca and the control of access to the island.
If the ICJ judges agree, it could result in one of two possible outcomes.
SINGAPORE: PEDRA BRANCA, MIDDLE ROCKS AND SOUTH LEDGE
MALAYSIA: NOTHING
THE court could award sovereignty over Pedra Branca, the Middle Rocks and South Ledge to Singapore.
That would be 'optimum' for Singapore, Ambassador-at-large Tommy Koh said.
Such an outcome would maintain the status quo. Singapore would then have to decide how to delimit its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone around Pedra Branca.
'If these zones overlap with those of our two neighbours (Malaysia and Indonesia), then we will have to sit down with them to negotiate an agreed delimitation...and we may have to talk to Malaysia about fishing rights in Pedra Branca's waters,' he added.
------------------------------
SINGAPORE: PEDRA BRANCA
MALAYSIA: MIDDLE ROCKS AND SOUTH LEDGE
THE court could award sovereignty over Pedra Branca to Singapore and sovereignty over the Middle Rocks and South Ledge to Malaysia.
Middle Rocks and South Ledge are two maritime features that lie within three nautical miles of Pedra Branca.
Ambassador Koh said he would regard such a split decision as still 'a good outcome because the lighthouse is on Pedra Branca and of the three maritime features, the largest and the most significant is Pedra Branca'.
On the economic importance of Pedra Branca to Singapore, Ambassador Koh noted that the island is strategically located at the eastern entrance of the Strait of Singapore.
The Strait is a key channel for international shipping and some 900 ships pass through it each day.
'Since our port is so important to our livelihood, freedom and safety of navigation are critical and part of our core national interest,' he said
May 26, 2008
PEDRA BRANCA JUDGMENT
For all our sakes, it's time to move on
NOW the International Court of Justice has made its ruling on Pedra Branca, I am sure there will be no shortage of 'experts', 'analysts', 'patriots' and so on, who will take every opportunity to voice their opinion in public.
I would like to make a plea to the media, to restrain from prolonging or highlighting this topic for public discussion.
It will not help to foster goodwill between our two countries; it will only breed more disagreement and discontent.
Both governments have, in their wisdom, accepted the judgment of an independent court. So must the people.
We should encourage people to leave behind the burden of political baggage, and move on to a better future.
For the good of both countries, the media should encourage people to look forward to a better future and not look back at the past.
For the sake of both Singapore and Malaysia, it is better to find ways to build a better future, rather than find fault on what occurred in the past.
Dr George Wong
------------------------------------
SM: Accepting outcome shows maturing of ties
Disappointed that S'pore did not get Middle Rocks but he calls ruling 'fair and best'
By zakir Hussain
THE world court's decision on Pedra Branca has untied a 'tricky knot' in bilateral ties between Singapore and Malaysia, Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong said yesterday.
Both sides can now 'look forward instead of being bogged down by this issue', he told reporters ahead of a charity golf tournament to raise funds for the needy in Yuhua constituency.
He also lauded the calm reactions in both countries to the decision, saying that this showed 'a maturing of our relationship'.
'This augurs well for the future. We can now look at things in a more positive way and handle any further disputes in the same matured manner,' he added.
Last Friday, the International Court of Justice in The Hague awarded Pedra Branca to Singapore, ending a 28-year tussle for sovereignty over the island.
The ICJ also awarded two smaller outcrops near it, Middle Rocks, to Malaysia. But it did not make a definitive ruling on South Ledge, a rock formation visible only at low tide.
That rock belongs to whoever owns the territorial waters it sits in, the ICJ said, adding that it was not tasked with defining those boundaries.
Even before the ruling, both sides said they would accept the court's outcome - something Mr Goh described as 'positive'.
Since the ruling, some Malaysian leaders have also described the decision as a 'win-win' situation.
It was in 1994 that then-prime minister Goh and his then-Malaysian counterpart Mahathir Mohamad decided to refer the issue of overlapping claims to Pedra Branca to the ICJ.
Asked if the ruling brought closure for him, Mr Goh said it did: 'It has been a long drawn out saga...And I look at the outcome in a positive way.'
As to whether he was worried about sentiments in Johor, he said: 'We will leave it to the Malaysians to manage.'
'So far they've managed it very well. They of course are unhappy, and I thought, nevertheless, they reacted in a rather calm manner,' he said.
'Personally, I'm disappointed that we did not get the award for Middle Rocks,' he added.
'I thought it would either be all or nothing, a binary solution, because the three rocky outcrops were quite close to one another.'
'But nevertheless, there is a hint of Solomon in the decision,' he said, referring to the Biblical king known for his wisdom.
'And I think perhaps it's the fair and best outcome for both sides.'
As for South Ledge, both parties have to sit down and decide how to draw boundaries according to international law to determine ownership.
But Mr Goh is optimistic about the eventual outcome. 'I do believe that given the goodwill assured by both sides in bringing this dispute to the ICJ, the matter will be settled quite amicably,' he said.
zakirh@sph.com.sg
--------------------------
What is Pedra Branca?
Pedra Branca is an island that sits at the eastern entrance of the Straits of Singapore. It lies about 24 nautical miles to the east of Singapore.
Its location has long been of strategic importance to us as it commands the entire eastern approach to the Straits of Singapore, through which almost 900 ships pass daily.
The oldest feature on the island is Horsburgh Lighthouse, which was built on the island by the British between 1847 and 1851.
What is Singapore’s case with regard to Pedra Branca?
It is Singapore’s case that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore because the British colonial government took possession of the island over 160 years ago to build Horsburgh Lighthouse and other structures on it. At that time, Pedra Branca was uninhabited and it belonged to no one.
Since then, Singapore has continuously and openly conducted acts of a sovereign nature over the entire island and its surrounding waters. In contrast, Malaysia did nothing and did not protest against any of the actions of Singapore.
In 1953, Johor stated in official correspondence with Singapore that it did not claim ownership over Pedra Branca. Malaysia also published a series of official maps from 1962 to 1975 depicting Pedra Branca as belonging to Singapore.
What are Middle Rocks and South Ledge?
Middle Rocks and South Ledge are two maritime features to the south of Pedra Branca. Middle Rocks consists of two clusters of rocks situated 0.6 nautical miles south of Pedra Branca. South Ledge is a low-tide elevation (in other words, it is submerged at high tide) further south, 2.1 nautical miles, of Pedra Branca.
It is Singapore’s case that sovereignty over Middle Rocks and South Ledge belongs to the country that has sovereignty over Pedra Branca.
Friday, April 18, 2008
CHINA'S TIBET POLICY
CHINA'S TIBET POLICY
Misplaced faith in economic formula
By Sim Chi Yin, Correspondent
12 April 2008
WHEN anti-government riots first broke out in Tibet last month, China's media blacked out the news.
Then days later, the silence gave way to a torrent of articles giving Beijing's version of events, blasting the Dalai Lama and castigating the foreign media for 'distorting' the truth. Beijing trotted out its Tibetologists and its diplomats distributed CDs with horrific footage showing riot-hit Lhasa.
Missing from all the rhetoric, however, were answers to some burning questions: What went wrong with China's policies on Tibet? What needs to be changed to prevent a repeat or an escalation of the confrontation?
Governments the world over find ethnic-minority policies tough. But experts say the scale and unprecedented duration of the recent protests indicate the failure of Beijing's Tibet policy which, hitherto, aimed to douse 'separatism' with economic growth, govern Tibet through a largely Han Chinese elite and assimilate the province through mass migration.
Following the worst rioting in Lhasa in 20 years on March 14, about 50 - or up to 100, according to some estimates - other protests broke out in other parts of Tibet and in the Tibetan areas of three nearby provinces.
Some of these protests took place despite a heavy security presence and involved not just monks - as in previous protests - but also urban youth, nomads and students.
What went wrong?
AT THE heart of China's Tibet policy is the same tried-and-tested formula that has worked elsewhere in the country - generate economic growth and raise living standards. By simultaneously keeping a tight grip on Tibetan identity, this approach was to have delivered the remote land firmly into modernity.
But this faith in the power of material progress seems to have blindsided Beijing to the gathering storm in Tibet. The Chinese 'seemed to have come to believe their own propaganda - they said the Tibetans were happy and they believed it', said Tibet expert Robert Barnett of Columbia University.
China-watcher Professor Richard Baum of the University of California, Los Angeles, noted that Beijing has a 'trained incapacity' to look at Tibet objectively.
'The current regime has invested so much political and propaganda capital in trying to destroy the so-called Dalai clique's hated 'splittism' that they're blind to the many legitimate smouldering complaints of the Tibetans that periodically erupt into open hostility and protest,' he explained.
Another major problem in Beijing's Tibet policy is the government's failure to understand the depth of Tibetans' faith in the Dalai Lama, said Professor Zheng Yongnian, head of research at Nottingham University's China Policy Institute.
'People who don't have faith are unlikely to understand the depth of belief' of others, he said, alluding to the Chinese Communist Party's avowed atheism.
This incapacity also leads Beijing to another fundamental error: Conflating the Dalai Lama with the more radical exile groups as one amorphous 'Dalai clique'. That undifferentiated treatment and the ongoing bashing of the 'clique' grates on Tibetans' ears and makes it tough for Beijing to restart dialogue with the Dalai Lama.
There is also a whiff of Han chauvinism at the heart of Beijing's ethnic policy. For instance, each of China's five 'autonomous regions' has a Han Chinese as its top party official.
To many Tibetans, the official narrative of the CCP 'liberating' backward Tibetans from theocracy and serfdom when the People's Liberation Army marched in in 1950 smacks of chauvinism. Tibet party boss Zhang Qingli reinforced that sense of superiority recently by declaring that the central government is 'the parent to the Tibetan people' and the CCP is 'the real Buddha for Tibetans'.
Beijing not blind
MAINLAND Tibetologists argue that it is wrong to assume that there is no debate in Beijing about its policies in Tibet. It has made adjustments.
In an interview, Professor Tanzen Lhundup, a sociologist and vice-director at the Chinese Centre for Tibetan Studies' Institute of Sociology and Economics in Beijing, defended China's record in Tibet over the past 30 years.
He acknowledged that the benefits of Tibet's economic boom have not trickled down enough to regular Tibetans, and said that some policies may need a bit of tweaking.
But finger-pointing by foreigners is not going to help Beijing improve policies, he said. 'A family's problems should be discussed and resolved within the family.'
There are signs that Beijing is perhaps starting to shift to a more nuanced position, with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly urging the Dalai Lama to use his influence to quell the unrest. But such moderate voices may not be getting through or getting translated into policies, said Prof Zheng, a political scientist.
He added: 'Fundamentally, the intransigence on Tibet policy comes down to the very nature of the Chinese political system. If it were a multi-party state, there would be rigorous policy debate and pressure to change. Right now, when China is in a crisis situation, it is very often the hardline advocates who win.'
Where to now?
ON PAPER, events in the past month should be enough to stir Beijing to action. With protests also erupting in the other restive region of Xinjiang last week, the central government cannot but be aware of the need to change its tactics towards minorities.
After all, it has shown itself capable of radical change since the economy was opened up in the 1980s. Even on sensitive territory-related issues like Taiwan and Hong Kong, Beijing has shown itself to be more accommodating in recent years.
But the only change Beijing has indicated it will make in Tibet so far is to step up 'patriotic education', first introduced in earnest after the 1989 unrest. This time the sessions will target young monks to make them 'patriotic, religion-loving and law-abiding', said the state-run Tibet Daily newspaper last week.
That will only deepen resentment among Tibetans, say many scholars, who urge the resumption of talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. These were halted after six rounds from 2002 to 2006 yielded little progress.
And Beijing has room in its Constitution to be more flexible in dealing with the Tibetans' quest for self-rule, noted law professor Michael Davis of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who has studied China's periphery. The law provides for 'special administrative regions' to be created 'in the light of the specific conditions', like in the case of Hong Kong.
With the Dalai Lama ageing and Beijing's Tibet policy in tatters, there is a new urgency to bring some resolution to the five- decade-long struggle.
As Prof Lhundup put it: 'It's been like a Hollywood movie, complete with high points and low points. But we need to forget history in order to move forward. It's in everyone's interest - China's, the Tibetans' and the Dalai Lama's.
'I hope for a happy ending.'
simcy@sph.com.sg
Misplaced faith in economic formula
By Sim Chi Yin, Correspondent
12 April 2008
WHEN anti-government riots first broke out in Tibet last month, China's media blacked out the news.
Then days later, the silence gave way to a torrent of articles giving Beijing's version of events, blasting the Dalai Lama and castigating the foreign media for 'distorting' the truth. Beijing trotted out its Tibetologists and its diplomats distributed CDs with horrific footage showing riot-hit Lhasa.
Missing from all the rhetoric, however, were answers to some burning questions: What went wrong with China's policies on Tibet? What needs to be changed to prevent a repeat or an escalation of the confrontation?
Governments the world over find ethnic-minority policies tough. But experts say the scale and unprecedented duration of the recent protests indicate the failure of Beijing's Tibet policy which, hitherto, aimed to douse 'separatism' with economic growth, govern Tibet through a largely Han Chinese elite and assimilate the province through mass migration.
Following the worst rioting in Lhasa in 20 years on March 14, about 50 - or up to 100, according to some estimates - other protests broke out in other parts of Tibet and in the Tibetan areas of three nearby provinces.
Some of these protests took place despite a heavy security presence and involved not just monks - as in previous protests - but also urban youth, nomads and students.
What went wrong?
AT THE heart of China's Tibet policy is the same tried-and-tested formula that has worked elsewhere in the country - generate economic growth and raise living standards. By simultaneously keeping a tight grip on Tibetan identity, this approach was to have delivered the remote land firmly into modernity.
But this faith in the power of material progress seems to have blindsided Beijing to the gathering storm in Tibet. The Chinese 'seemed to have come to believe their own propaganda - they said the Tibetans were happy and they believed it', said Tibet expert Robert Barnett of Columbia University.
China-watcher Professor Richard Baum of the University of California, Los Angeles, noted that Beijing has a 'trained incapacity' to look at Tibet objectively.
'The current regime has invested so much political and propaganda capital in trying to destroy the so-called Dalai clique's hated 'splittism' that they're blind to the many legitimate smouldering complaints of the Tibetans that periodically erupt into open hostility and protest,' he explained.
Another major problem in Beijing's Tibet policy is the government's failure to understand the depth of Tibetans' faith in the Dalai Lama, said Professor Zheng Yongnian, head of research at Nottingham University's China Policy Institute.
'People who don't have faith are unlikely to understand the depth of belief' of others, he said, alluding to the Chinese Communist Party's avowed atheism.
This incapacity also leads Beijing to another fundamental error: Conflating the Dalai Lama with the more radical exile groups as one amorphous 'Dalai clique'. That undifferentiated treatment and the ongoing bashing of the 'clique' grates on Tibetans' ears and makes it tough for Beijing to restart dialogue with the Dalai Lama.
There is also a whiff of Han chauvinism at the heart of Beijing's ethnic policy. For instance, each of China's five 'autonomous regions' has a Han Chinese as its top party official.
To many Tibetans, the official narrative of the CCP 'liberating' backward Tibetans from theocracy and serfdom when the People's Liberation Army marched in in 1950 smacks of chauvinism. Tibet party boss Zhang Qingli reinforced that sense of superiority recently by declaring that the central government is 'the parent to the Tibetan people' and the CCP is 'the real Buddha for Tibetans'.
Beijing not blind
MAINLAND Tibetologists argue that it is wrong to assume that there is no debate in Beijing about its policies in Tibet. It has made adjustments.
In an interview, Professor Tanzen Lhundup, a sociologist and vice-director at the Chinese Centre for Tibetan Studies' Institute of Sociology and Economics in Beijing, defended China's record in Tibet over the past 30 years.
He acknowledged that the benefits of Tibet's economic boom have not trickled down enough to regular Tibetans, and said that some policies may need a bit of tweaking.
But finger-pointing by foreigners is not going to help Beijing improve policies, he said. 'A family's problems should be discussed and resolved within the family.'
There are signs that Beijing is perhaps starting to shift to a more nuanced position, with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly urging the Dalai Lama to use his influence to quell the unrest. But such moderate voices may not be getting through or getting translated into policies, said Prof Zheng, a political scientist.
He added: 'Fundamentally, the intransigence on Tibet policy comes down to the very nature of the Chinese political system. If it were a multi-party state, there would be rigorous policy debate and pressure to change. Right now, when China is in a crisis situation, it is very often the hardline advocates who win.'
Where to now?
ON PAPER, events in the past month should be enough to stir Beijing to action. With protests also erupting in the other restive region of Xinjiang last week, the central government cannot but be aware of the need to change its tactics towards minorities.
After all, it has shown itself capable of radical change since the economy was opened up in the 1980s. Even on sensitive territory-related issues like Taiwan and Hong Kong, Beijing has shown itself to be more accommodating in recent years.
But the only change Beijing has indicated it will make in Tibet so far is to step up 'patriotic education', first introduced in earnest after the 1989 unrest. This time the sessions will target young monks to make them 'patriotic, religion-loving and law-abiding', said the state-run Tibet Daily newspaper last week.
That will only deepen resentment among Tibetans, say many scholars, who urge the resumption of talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. These were halted after six rounds from 2002 to 2006 yielded little progress.
And Beijing has room in its Constitution to be more flexible in dealing with the Tibetans' quest for self-rule, noted law professor Michael Davis of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who has studied China's periphery. The law provides for 'special administrative regions' to be created 'in the light of the specific conditions', like in the case of Hong Kong.
With the Dalai Lama ageing and Beijing's Tibet policy in tatters, there is a new urgency to bring some resolution to the five- decade-long struggle.
As Prof Lhundup put it: 'It's been like a Hollywood movie, complete with high points and low points. But we need to forget history in order to move forward. It's in everyone's interest - China's, the Tibetans' and the Dalai Lama's.
'I hope for a happy ending.'
simcy@sph.com.sg
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